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Cyber security is a big and increasing problem. Yet many software developers still have little 
interest in software security. To change this, we need ‘interventions’ to development teams 
to motivate and help them towards security improvement.  
A series of interventions costing less than two days’ total effort from a facilitator can 
significantly improve the software security of the products developed by teams in a wide 
range of companies.  
This report introduces this series of interventions, explains how they were derived from 
previous research in industry, and evaluates using Participative Action Research their 
effectiveness with software development teams in three widely-varied organisations. The 
interventions are: 
• A game-based Incentivisation Session, in which participants work in groups to 
prioritise security enhancements; 
• A lightweight Threat Modelling Session, based on ideation of possible issues and 
agents; and 
• Repeated follow-up sessions, involving discussion, threat modelling or risk analysis 
according to the needs of the participants. 
The interventions proved very effective with the teams in two companies, that were less 
experienced and knowledgeable about software security. They were only marginally effective 
with more experienced teams.  
We conclude that this intervention process provides a cost-effective and powerful means to 
improve the effectiveness of the majority of development teams who still lack the vital skills 
and motivation to deliver secure software. 
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1 Introduction 
Software security and privacy are now major issues: the cost and potential threat to us all is 
increasing dramatically [5]. With over 100 billion lines of code created a year [5], the effectiveness of 
developers at creating secure software is vital1. 
Unfortunately, many if not most developers consider software security to be ‘not their problem’ 
[13]. Developers may expect security to be handled by a different team; consider it too expensive to 
incorporate without a significant drive from product management; or simply not know where to 
start. 
In prior work [10,11], the authors identified through two sets of interviews with leading software 
security experts, a range of eight techniques (see Section 2.2) for people to encourage and support 
software development teams to deliver secure code. These techniques have the potential to 
improve secure software development. 
In the project described in this report we investigated having a consultant lead the introduction of 
the techniques using lightweight consultancy ‘interventions’ in three very different organisations.  
The contributions of this short report are: 
1. A low-cost but effective intervention method to help teams improve their development 
security, and 
2. Exploration of the intervention method’s effectiveness with a range of types of development 
team  
The rest of this report is as follows. Section 2 explains the research and analysis methods in detail. 
Section 3 introduces the companies and development teams involved. Section 4 discusses the 
results obtained and compares the approach with existing practice, and Section 5 summarises the 
conclusions. 
2 Methodology 
2.1 Research Method 
Initially we considered an ethnographic research methodology, but it was inappropriate for a 
situation where an observing researcher was also a key participant. Instead we adopted a method 
used in many forms of academic social research: Action Research [12]. This approach emphasises 
participation and action; it aims to understand a situation in a practical context, and to improve it by 
changing the situation. 
Specifically, we used Participatory Action Research [1], with the lead author working, as ‘intervener’, 
directly with the participants. In each of three companies we first interviewed a selection of the 
participants to establish a baseline in terms of their current understanding and practice related to 
secure software development. We then carried out a series of intervention workshops with 
members of the development teams, led by the intervener. Finally, a suitable time after the final 
intervention workshop, we re-interviewed the same, as far as possible, participants as before. 
The audio recordings of the interviews and most of the workshops – a total of 19 hours of audio – 
were transcribed and qualitatively analysed. In coding, we were looking for aspects of security 
improvement implied by statements from the speakers. Specifically, we were looking for evidence of 
improvements in the security of developed software. 
                                                          
1 Throughout this report we use ‘secure’ and ‘security’ to refer to privacy aspects of software development as 
well as security ones. 
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This research was approved by the Lancaster University Faculty of Science and Technology ethics 
committee.  
2.2 Implementing the Techniques as Practical Interventions. 
The purpose of this work was to find ways best to improve developer security using the eight 
interventions derived from previous work [10,11], which are as follows: 
Incentivisation 
Session 




Working as a team to identify actors and potential threats; following this up 
with risk assessment and mitigation decisions. 
On-the-Job 
Training 
brownbag sessions sharing security knowledge; also mentoring and having 
developers more expert at security join the team.  
Continuous 
Reminder 
Regular activities to keep up the teams’ awareness of the need for security.  
Component 
Choice 
Choosing secure components, and keeping them up-to-date; adding tools to the 
toolchain to support this. 
Automated 
Static Analysis 
Using code analysis tools to identify certain categories of security error. 
Penetration 
Testing 
Having security testers identify flaws, based on a knowledge of common defects 
and using specialist web based tools. 
Code Review Introducing scheduled meetings to analyse code for security defects; having 
other programmers or security experts review code for problems. 
Each intervention had a variety of forms, suitable for different development budgets, team sizes, 
and team cultures. What forms would be suitable for us, outside interveners, with limited 
knowledge of the development team? 
Looking at the list of interventions, we observed that four – the first four – are to do with process 
and can be implemented to some extent by a team lead or manager; the remaining four are more 
technical and must be implemented by developers themselves. As outside consultants, therefore, 
we concentrated on the process interventions, and used opportunities within the consultancy to 
promote and improve the technical interventions. 
The biggest challenge was to find a suitable way to provide the Incentivisation Session. For this, we 
used a game, the ‘Agile Security Game’ [9], developed by the lead author. This was based on the 
‘Mumba’ role-playing game invented by Frey et al. [4], to help elicit participants’ prior experience of 
real-life security attacks. The ‘Agile Security Game’ variant, however, was designed simply to 
educate developers about security. In it, participants act as product managers, selecting security-
enhancing product improvements with varying costs and learning whether their choices deter 
attacks.  
Threat Modelling, too, was also challenging to implement. But as technical lead for a major mobile 
money project, the lead author had faced this problem in a commercial project. With the help of a 
consultant security expert [14], his development team had developed a lightweight brainstorming 
process to identify threats and potential attackers [6]. We determined to use the same approach for 
these interventions.  
Given our emphasis on a ‘lightweight’ approach, On-the-Job Training was not practical as an 
external intervention. However, all the companies already had some form of such training taking 
place.  
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The final process-based intervention was Continuous Reminder. For this we agreed to a monthly 
meeting, by Skype video conferencing to act as a regular ‘nudge’ of the importance of security. 
To introduce the more technical interventions, we used an ad hoc approach. The facilitator 
mentioned and discussed each of the remaining interventions with the developers during the Threat 
Modelling, the mitigation discussions, and subsequent Continuous Reminder sessions, using 
suggestions from the developers as cues.  
2.3 Intervention Attitude 
We know from literature that developers dislike formal processes [2]; we know also that developers, 
like most other people, tend to dislike being told what to do and will react against it [33, ch. 2], So at 
no point did the facilitator interact with the development teams using terms like “you must” or “it’s 
essential that”. On the other hand, we also know from personal experience that developers are very 
happy to take action to solve problems that they agree to be important. Therefore, throughout the 
workshops and game, we allowed the developers themselves to drive the solutions; as facilitators 
we provided only guidance. 
3 Participating Companies 
This section introduces the three different companies, with the projects and development teams 
involved. To preserve confidentiality, we have changed all names, and the exact functionality of the 
products involved. 
3.1 Company A 
Company A is a small-to-medium company employing around 50 people in the UK. Set up about 10 
years ago, it has a single product which is sold both as ‘software as a service’, and as an installable 
system for clients’ own sites. This product manages sensitive data, and is used by some very large 
organisations, including several that are household names. 
The company development teams show some of the enthusiasm and characteristics of a start-up. 
We observed a culture of technological improvement, and a willingness to embrace change.  
3.2 Company B 
Company B is a tiny non-profit start-up, run on a part-time basis by two professionals: an 
educationalist and a software project manager. Other staff also assist on a part-time basis. The 
company purpose is to provide work experience for promising young people who would otherwise 
be unable to get initial jobs in IT. 
3.3 Company C 
Company C is a well-known and long-established multi-national organisation, providing information 
services mainly via the Internet to a range of companies and individuals. The team members 
involved were testers, managers and programmers of the membership system. This is mature 
software, but the company has a policy of continuous architectural improvement. All the team were 
competent and experienced professionals, but in contrast to company A we noted more emphasis 
on inter-departmental politics. 
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4 Results 
4.1 Intervention Time Requirements 
While the interventions took place over three to four months for each company, the total effort 
required from the intervener was relatively short: excluding the time for travel and research 
interviews the total effort spent for the interventions was less than one working day. Adding 
another day for preparation – scheduling, preparing materials for the workshops, etc. – the total 
time spent by the intervener on the interventions was less than two working days for each company. 
The time spent by the development teams was typically 3-4 hours by the whole team, and 2-3 more 
hours by the more senior members. Thus the time requirements for this set of interventions was as 
follows: 
 
The cost of the interventions, therefore, is relatively small, and is within the scope of a wide range of 
organisations. 
4.2 Outcomes Attributable to the Interventions 
This section identifies the concrete outcomes attributable to the interventions. Further details will 
be presented in sections 4.3 and 4.4. 
4.2.1 Outcomes for Company A 
We identified at least two significant improvements in Company A’s product and process security as 
a result of the interventions. Beforehasnd, the developers had been thinking of security 
improvements as line by line improvements in the code they themselves had written. Afterwards, 
they understood that their most effective security improvements were likely to be elsewhere. 
Specifically, they made two changes:  
1. They introduced a components’ security checker to their build cycle, and embarked on a 
programme of updating and replacing components according to their security 
vulnerabilities. 
2. They identified their own existing customers as competitors with each other, and therefore 
potential ‘attackers’, and identified that the permissions functionality was therefore a major 
privacy issue; making fixes in this area was likely to give security wins. 
4.2.2 Outcomes for Company B 
Company B, coming from a lower baseline in terms of security experience, had more potential 
improvements in process and in product security. As a result of the first Threat Modelling process 
we identified two changes. They changed the planned design of the website not to use local 
databases for storing form data; and they introduced improved security for development 
workstations and code repositories, keeping them upgraded and password-secured, against the 
threat of malicious code msodifications or access to personal data. Later they made further 
improvements: the student developers improved their security hygiene; and in a subsequent project 
they took particular care with web service access keys. 
Total Cost 
 
Intervention facilitator: 15 man hours 
Development team: 20 - 70 man hours 
depending on team size. 
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4.2.3 Outcomes for Company C 
It was difficult to identify any concrete outcomes from the interventions for Company C. The primary 
reason for this is that their security knowledge and practice as a team were already good – rather 
better than they may have realised. While some security improvements were made, we believe 
these were the result of a wider awareness of security needs within the organisation rather than 
specifically because of our interventions.  
Indeed, the two main issues highlighted from the Threat Modelling – control of physical access to 
workstations and the relationship with the company’s security department – were outside the 
control of any of the participants in the workshops. This hadn’t been identified before; but we have 
no evidence that matters have changed. 
4.3 Interventions Adopted 
Table 1 lists all interventions from section 2.2, and the extent to which each was adopted by the 
three companies. 
 
As shown, there were some further activities prompted by the interventions, but by no means all. 
While the last two (Penetration Testing and Code Review) might have been inappropriate [10] for 
cash- and discipline-strapped Company B, we might have hoped to consider Automated Static 
Analysis for both Companies A and B; in fact the possibility was not discussed. One possible 
approach to encourage considering these forgotten interventions was some form of checklist.  
Another improvement suggested by participants from both Company B and Company C was an initial 
presentation explaining the aims and process of the interventions.  
Table 1: Summary of Interventions Eventually Adopted 









Threat Modelling Led by Intervener Led by Intervener (2 
sessions) 
Led by Intervener 
On-the-Job Training Instigated study of 







Already in place – 
e.g. C5 had worked in 
the Security Team. 




Stream of ‘incidents’ 
to handle. 
Component Choice Introduced due to 
Intervention 
Introduced (at a basic 
level) due to 
intervention. 
Already in place. 
Automated Static 
Analysis 
  Already in place. 
Penetration Testing Already in place  Already in place. 
Code Review Already in place (peer 
review of all changes) 
 Already in place 
(peer review of all 
changes). 
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4.4 Improvements on Existing Practice 
Current practice in interventions is often based on Penestration Testing. Aside from the high cost [7], 
this approach can prove ineffective in the longer term [8].  
The approach described in this paper is significantly less costly, in that the skills required are the 
much more readily-available ones associated with facilitation, and the software security knowledge 
required is an overview rather than in-depth. It also requires a smaller amount of effort from the 
interveners (section 4.1) and achieved identifiable impact in terms of security improvements 
(section 4.2). 
The research approach, Participative Action Research, provided a useful framework for evaluating 
the interventions, and the coding techniques provided a measure of objectivity to the results.  
We suggest that the techniques described in this paper, supported by the improvements of an initial 
presentation and a checklist of interventions as discussed in section 4.3, offer significant potential as 
the basis for a lightweight programme to improve the security performance of non-security-expert 
development teams. 
5 Conclusion 
This report summarises the effect of introducing a light-touch facilitation-based set of ‘interventions’ 
to development teams in three very different organisations: a mature SME, a start-up focussed on 
providing work experience, and a multinational information service provider.  The intervention 
required limited effort from the facilitator, and relatively little from the development teams. The 
authors demonstrated, via an Action Research method, evidence of security enhancements 
introduced by the less experienced teams, while more security-expert teams only benefitted 
marginally.  
Lightweight, facilitation-based, interventions of the kind used here offer the potential to help any 
software development teams with limited current security skills to improve their software security. 
Widescale adoption of the process will empower developers, and play a much-needed role in 
improving software security for all end users. 
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